Abstract
INTRODUCTION
It has been 24 years since South Africa had witnessed the collapse of apartheid to become a non-racial democratic state, which was met with euphoria, not only in South Africa, but across the African continent and throughout the world. The whole of Africa celebrated with South Africa during April 1994 as black South Africans exercised, for the first time, their inalienable right to freely choose a political party to govern them.
Whilst 24 years is a drop in time, those years have also been marred by the vicious outbursts of xenophobia/Afrophobia in South Africa in 2008, 2010 and 2015.
1 On 24 February 2017 the South African Police Service (SAPS) employed water cannons and stun grenades to disperse anti-immigration protesters in the capital, Pretoria, when the protest became violent.
2 According to the journalist Jean Pierre Misago, "The reality is that this type of violence is a daily occurrence in the country, although it does not always get media attention. It has, in fact, become a long-standing feature in post-apartheid South Africa." 3 This article asserts that it is necessary and important to reflect on how the African continent, and particularly the Front-Line States (FLS), contributed to the struggle to end apartheid, liberating South Africa in particular, and southern Africa generally, from the brutalities of white minority rule. In addition, it was the spirit of Pan-Africanism that motivated the efforts of the FLS and other African nations to assist in the liberation struggle of South Africa and, therefore, the recent violence and hostility directed at other black Africans residing in South Africa is wholly unethical and immoral in the context of the material sacrifices 1 There is a growing literature on the development of "Afrophobia" and "xenophobia" in South Africa. See, for example, the work of D Matsinhe, "Africa's fear of itself: The ideology of Makwerekwere in South Africa", Third World Quarterly 32(2), 2011. Matsinhe prefers the term "Afrophobia", which he describes as a hatred for other black African residents in South Africa who are deemed to be foreigners or Makwerekwere. The latter is a derogatory term in South African popular languages which refers to the unintelligible sounds and languages of black foreigners. Matsinhe emphasises that white foreigners have not been the target of such outbursts and, therefore, "Afrophobia" is distinct from "xenophobia", which can be described as fear, hostility or hatred of strangers. Afrophobia is a loathing and fear of specifically other black Africans perceived to be Makwerekwere on African soil. See also, M Neocosmos, "From 'foreign natives' to 'native foreigners': Explaining xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa", CODESRIA such sister nations made. 4 Perhaps historical amnesia has filtered into the South African consciousness with regard to the contributions many African countries -including immediate neighbours and other sister African nationsmade in assisting the liberation struggle in South Africa, and therefore, integral to the efforts to eradicate xenophobia/Afrophobia, must be a public education campaign to restore to the national memory how African countries aided the South African liberation struggle.
Memory and forgetting have increased as spectacles and phenomena of contemporary literature and art, as well as growing into a multidisciplinary field of study, within the academic discipline of history. "Remembering and forgetting are two sides -or different processes -of the same coin, that is, memory. Forgetting is the very condition for remembering", writes Eril. 5 The subject matter of memory is not only profoundly transnational, but, in the context of Africa, memory may take a Pan-Africanist orientation. As Abdul-Raheem contends, "No one [African] country can be a sustainable miracle if its neighbours are in hell."
6 Hence, histories and cultural experiences do not remain in cultural silos and, in fact, spill over physical and mental borders as peoples and communities intermarry and interact in socio-economic and political forms.
In short, whilst thousands of South Africans lost their lives during the years of apartheid rule (1948-1994) -and also prior to the formal adoption of apartheid in 1948 -many Mozambicans, Angolans, Zimbabweans and others in the FLS also lost their lives. How many South Africans are aware of this fact? Furthermore, the FLS were considerably damaged by the economic destabilisation of their countries by the racist regional overlord and the bitter politics of the Cold War; a context in which we should also locate the circumstances in which African countries assisted the liberation struggle in South Africa. The political rivalry and conflict between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) after the Second World War until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, was at times played out by proxy in Africa and, especially, in the southern region of Africa. South Africa, in particular, was considered an important region in the world as, "investments and access to important minerals were among the most important imperatives for the superpowers' support of the apartheid government".
7 Ndlovu provides a Another example of the pervasiveness of Cold War politics is illustrated in the fact that many of the Francophone countries under the extensive influence of their former colonial master, France, remained silent as France continued to sell arms to the white minority regime 12 and, therefore, these Francophone nations were upholding a duplicitous policy, as they were simultaneously members of the OAU which condemned the sale of weapons to the racist government of South Africa.
The politics of the Cold War also pervaded the intervention of Cuba in the southern Africa region and, specifically, in the affairs of Angola. One cannot examine the contribution of African countries to the South African liberation struggle without mentioning the colossal contribution of this small island in the Caribbean which can also be considered as an extension of Africa with its unyielding commitment to international solidarity. Such solidarity translated into this tiny country sending thousands of military troops to Angola in order to expel the invading South African army both in 1975 and in 1988. Cuba's intervention highlighted not only the willingness of Cubans to die alongside continental Africans for the principles of democracy, freedom, justice and equality for the liberation of others, but the duplicity of the Western imperialist nations who condemned Cuba for this action, whilst remaining silent on the atrocities and oppression of the white minority regime against the black majority of its citizens. Disappearing into historical obscurity is the fact that, "leading members of the Swazi royal family under the leadership of Queen Regent Labotsibeni were members of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), later renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923. This was made concrete by the fact that Labotsibeni was one of the financiers of the mouth piece of the SANNC, Abantu-Batho".
13 Also significant is the fact that in the launch of the SANNC, there were two Swazi members, Prince Malunge and Benjamin Nxumalo, and that, for a long period, King Sobhuza II was a card-carrying member of the ANC 14 and the Swazi king also gave financial donations to the ANC. Therefore, Swaziland's role in South Africa's liberation struggle was an intimate one and it intensified in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Contributing to this intimacy was certainly geographical proximity, as the tiny kingdom of Swaziland strategically borders South Africa on three of its borders, in addition to sharing a border with Mozambique. This strategic location produced tensions with its regional overlord, but did not halt the determination of the Swazi state and Swazi citizens from assisting the South African liberation movements in their political objectives. Amnesia also prevails in the fact that King Letsie II of Lesotho also sent a delegation to the ANC's founding meeting on 12 January 1912 and was proclaimed Honorary President along with 22 other traditional leaders.
15
This article aims to provide an overview, for the subject matter is vast, of how African countries, particularly the FLS, assisted in the South African liberation struggle.
Analytically, the article is structured into five parts which discuss the ways African countries, along with Cuba, helped in the South African liberation struggle, followed by a conclusion. The five parts are divided thus: military training in a small village some distance from the capital, Rabat. They were surrounded by mountains in very cold weather. They were then sent to Tanganyika where they reported to the ANC leadership their dissatisfaction with the quality of training they had received in Morocco. 16 They were then despatched to the USSR in 1963. 17 Another group of 28 cadres led by S Senna and R Moagi were sent to Egypt for military training, because Moroccan training was perceived as unsatisfactorily in the light of reports from Mokopo's group. They described their experience in Egypt as, "efficient, ruthless and tough, but simply irrelevant to guerrilla warfare".
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

18
It is very interesting that MK cadres observed a significant distinction between training by the Russians and Egyptians. In short, there was an ideological difference, whereby the Russians believed that there was a need for inculcating political consciousness among trainees; freedom fighters had to analyse the social and material realities before launching an armed struggle, whereas, "the Egyptian approach […] turned the trainees into heartless and efficient killing machines".
19
During a state visit to Algeria in May 2010, President Jacob Zuma emphasized, "South Africa received immense support from Algeria during the struggle for liberation and that has influenced the good relationship enjoyed by the two countries currently."
20 Algeria appealed to Nelson Mandela because he was especially interested in ways to adapt Algeria's urban guerrilla and rural warfare to the South African context. 21 In Algeria, ANC soldiers were trained In Algeria, the ANC was recognised as a fully-fledged diplomatic institution and given strong political and material support for its activities and programmes.
Tiny Lesotho did not allow the ANC to open a fully-fledged office in Maseru, but they could operate, "a presence in Maseru", together with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). Both organisations operated from a private dwelling. It was Chris Hani, a member of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) and a key commander of MK, who set up the ANC presence in Maseru. He lived in Lesotho for almost eight years, moving in and out of the country while mobilising against apartheid. 23 Mothibe and Mushonga contend, "Hani's task was to infiltrate MK cadres into South Africa and build up the SACP/SACTU/ ANC alliance in the Free State and the Cape."
24 He was a regular visitor in both Basotho and South African anti-apartheid circles in Lesotho.
Whilst the ANC was neither allowed to open offices, nor to allow its cadres to carry weapons in Lesotho, unofficially it was permitted to store limited quantities of weapons in the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) armoury. 25 The ANC were not allowed to establish bases on Lesotho territory. However, Lesotho provided covert military training by absorbing some ANC cadres into the Lesotho Army, and by allowing members of the Army to provide a crash course in the use of firearms, grenades and techniques of subversion to ANC militants.
26
Some Basotho also joined the MK as combatants, for example Sechaba Sello, Khalaki Sello and others.
27
As a direct neighbour to South Africa, "Swaziland became a strategic territory for linking the South African liberation movements to areas of operation inside South Africa", 28 especially for the ANC. However, the PAC also established an operational base inside Swaziland, but their presence was not as numerous as that of the ANC. 29 The ANC presence enabled Robert "Malume" Manci to set up the, "Soweto to Swaziland underground route via the Eastern Transvaal (Mpumalanga 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEES
A critical manifestation of assistance given by many African countries, including the FLS, but also countries such as Nigeria and Ghana, were in the field of humanitarian assistance, as well as the provision of education, medical services and passports. For example, all South Africans based in Tanzania who travelled abroad to workshops and conferences were issued with Tanzanian passports and were recognised as Tanzanians citizens. In addition, ANC and PAC leaders were issued with diplomatic passports -other African countries did the same, such as Zambia and Ghana. Countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe provided tertiary education for South African refugees who flooded the region from the 1960s onwards, and particularly after the watershed of the 1976 Soweto uprising. Education was given specifically to South Africans to prepare them to take responsible positions in a future democratic majority government. This included tertiary education and professional training in various fields, such as teaching and administration. An example is when, just before MK was launched in December 1961, 21 nurses left South Africa after the introduction of the Nurses Act. This Act introduced racial segregation in training black and white nurses in South Africa. Around the same time, on 9 December 1961, Tanganyika gained independence and, when white British nurses in Tanganyika resigned, rather than work for an African government, Tanganyika showed solidarity with the South African liberation struggle by asking the ANC to send a contingent of qualified South African nurses. Among them were Kholeka, Edith Thunyiswa, Edith Ncwana and Edna Ncwana Miya. They had been recruited by Albertina Sisulu, a qualified nurse herself, working in Soweto. 35 Apart from allowing the PAC and the ANC to set up offices in Dar-esSalaam in 1962, following the banning of these two organisations, Tanzania's Other examples of humanitarian assistance are reflected in the fact that the Zambian Government ensured South African refugees that they were welcome. The government paid for the refugees' rentals, electricity, water and telephone expenses. They were integrated into Zambian society. Some freedom fighters were given pseudonyms to facilitate their passage to other countries.
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Lesotho, being an enclave within South Africa, was also a labour reserve for South Africa and heavily underdeveloped by the former colonial power, Britain. As, "no less than 20% of Lesotho's able-bodied men worked in South African mines and their cash earnings totalled almost three times the total wages and salaries paid within the country", 41 Lesotho was economically heavily dependent on South Africa, since all its food and almost all manufactured items came from its larger neighbour. Despite this harsh economic reality, the government of Lesotho under Leabua Jonathan supported PAC and ANC militants. For example, after the repression of the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, many PAC members fled to Maseru, the Lesotho capital, and were received by the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), as well as individual residents and communities. According to Mothibe and Mushonga, "The BCP leadership, using funds sourced from Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, built a tworoomed house" for PAC members.
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The PAC established its first political headquarters in Maseru in 1962, opened by PK Leballo, until it moved its office to Dar-es-Salaam in 1963. The PAC also set up an adult education centre at Seapoint Township for both PAC freedom fighters and a few Basotho students that was later paid for, in terms of salaries and science equipment, by the Lutheran Church in Geneva.
43 According to Mothibe and Mushonga, "Unlike countries such as Botswana, Tanzania, and others, Lesotho did not build refugee camps where South Africans were placed. Instead, all refugees were made part of the Basotho community, and accommodated in their homes and families, making it impossible to tell who was a refugee and who was not." 44 In Lesotho, refugees were provided with a monthly cash allowance for living expenses via the Lesotho Ministry of the Interior and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). They were also provided with scholarships.
45
It was in the area of education that Lesotho provided the greatest contributions. Consequently, many eminent South African academics, economists, lawyers and politicians acquired their first degrees at the University of Roma Botswana assisted the liberation of South Africa in myriad ways. Sharing a border with the racist regime meant that Botswana had to tread a difficult tightrope of maintaining some dialogue without diplomatic recognition of South Africa, while simultaneously providing asylum, transport and security for those freedom fighters proceeding northwards. 46 Mandela passed through Botswana in January 1962 and then boarded a plane to the then Tanganyika. Similarly, Joe Slovo and JB Marks arrived there two months later. Botswana was of the opinion that it would be suicidal to allow freedom fighters to launch attacks from within its borders. However, such activities were known to take place and when they did, the government of Botswana turned a blind eye. This caused suspicion and, in turn, threatened the security of the country.
The Botswana Government also used its police and special branch to gather intelligence and shared this with the appropriate liberation movement. In cases where the freedom fighters were arrested for violating the laws of Botswana, they were immediately sent north to Zambia and Tanzania. To avoid retaliatory action by the South African minority regime, freedom fighters would be imprisoned for a short stint and then released.
The upheaval after the Soweto uprising on 16 June 1976, and the subsequent exodus of young South Africans into neighbouring countries like Botswana, saw Botswana assist these refugees in finding scholarships, placement in local schools and transit to the north for military training.
47
Swaziland also gave refuge to hundreds of young South Africans who fled in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising.
48
Other forms of support that may be overlooked may fall under "logistical" support in the form of unloading, transportation, storage, and distribution of goods secured from friendly countries, which Tanzania carried out through the Special Duties Unit of the Tanzanian People's Defence Force. Military equipment, food, medicine and office equipment were distributed to freedom fighters in the camps in this manner. 
EFFORTS OF THE OAU, THE UN, THE NAM, AND THE COMMONWEALTH PLATFORMS
The OAU, as a body that had its origins in Pan-Africanism, sought to unite and free all Africans in Africa -particularly in the countries that continued to remain under colonial domination -via vigorous statements and actions in the context of the Cold War politics of the era. Consequently, the OAU carried out a dynamic international campaign for the enforcement of sanctions against South Africa. This included termination of trade and economic relations with the racist regime. The majority of OAU member states closed their ports and airports to South African ships and aeroplanes respectively, and prohibited South African planes from flying in their air space. Through the UN Africa Group, the OAU pushed the UN to pass an arms embargo against South Africa, leading to the Security Council (SC) Resolution 418, prohibiting the supply of arms and related materials to the apartheid regime in November 1977. The UN Africa Group was particularly proactive in the 1970s in campaigning for the liberation of South Africa. Ndlovu remarks, "Through the Africa Group based at the UN meeting of the Security Council [they] were convened to review the implementation of decisions and resolutions on apartheid. Action oriented and pragmatic strategies of action were adopted at the UN as a result of the pressure exerted by the Africa Group." 50 Moreover, the OAU invited the liberation movements to present their points of view at the OAU's official meetings. The OAU was also proactive in establishing the OAU Liberation Committee in 1963, which was headquartered in Dar-es-Salaam. Its functions included:
• mobilise resources for the liberation struggle;
• mobilise international solidarity for the liberation movements;
• assisting the liberation movements financially and materially;
• giving advice to the liberation movements;
• conflict management and resolution within and among liberation movements.
51
All member states of the OAU were encouraged to give financial contributions to the OAU Liberation Committee. Those who were outstanding in their contributions were Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Algeria, Angola, Egypt and Nigeria. Yet, it has to be noted that, "because of the inadequate and unreliable contributions by the OAU member states, the Liberation Committee (LC) 50 Ndlovu, "The geopolitics of apartheid", pp. 41-42. was always constrained by lack of funds from executing the formidable tasks of liberation".
52
At the level of the UN, Enuga S Reddy contends that, "African and nonaligned states were the driving force behind all UN and intergovernmental action against apartheid".
53 It was the African countries that pushed for an 11-member Special Committee within the UN that was set up in 1963 and had six African countries as members. Its role was to monitor developments in South Africa and to bring matters related to South Africa to the UN. For instance, when Mandela and his colleagues were brought to court on 8 October 1963, the Chairman of the Special Committee, Diallo Telli from Guinea, and the Africa Group within the UN, acted with extraordinary urgency. Throughout the years of apartheid until 1994, both the Special Committee and the Africa Group within the UN acted with unrelenting resolve to put pressure on Western countries to force the white minority regime to dismantle apartheid. They were also in the forefront of pushing for the numerous Special Committee resolutions, countless meetings on apartheid, the establishment of cultural boycotts, the arms embargo, the oil embargo, sanctions, divestment, the sports boycott, and other activities until the cultural boycott was lifted in 1991. South Africa was expelled from the Olympic Movement in 1970, and in 1977 the Commonwealth States signed the Gleneagles Agreement that committed their sporting nationals to noncontact with South Africa. In 1983, the UN published a register of entertainers who had performed in apartheid South Africa as a way to shame cultural artists lending legitimacy to a regime considered a pariah state within the international community.
The Special Committee of the UN established close cooperation with the Asian and African states, the Nordic states, the OAU, the NAM, as well as the specialised agencies. The mandate of UNOMSA also covered the monitoring of the electoral process at every stage and assessing the ultimate freedom and fairness of the election which cost approximately $38,9 million and came out of the regular UN budget.
56
With regard to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), President Mugabe of Zimbabwe became Chair of the NAM in 1986 and he took advantage of this to resuscitate the idea of military intervention in South Africa, but to no avail. He was also Chair of the FLS and lobbied for sanctions, as well as blocking a South African Springbok rugby tour to New Zealand. In September 1986 the NAM Summit Meeting was held in Harare and Mugabe demanded, "action and not words" against South Africa from NAM delegates. His call was answered when the NAM set up a solidarity fund to help the FLS in their fight against apartheid. It was called the "Africa Fund" and by August 1988 it had raised nearly US$250 million which was donated to the liberation movements in South Africa.
The Commonwealth also lent its voice and concerted action towards the clamour against apartheid rule. It was African states and India that announced they would boycott the Commonwealth Games in Christchurch in 1974 if the tour of the New Zealand Rugby Union went ahead in South Africa. The Prime Minister, Norman Kirk, pressed the Rugby Union to withdraw from the tour in the larger interests of New Zealand.
57
In July 1986 Nigeria spearheaded a 32-nation boycott of the 13 th Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh, Scotland, when the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, refused to implement sanctions recommended by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), set up in 1985 during the Commonwealth summit in the Bahamas in the same year. The role of EPG was to, "investigate and mediate the political crisis in South Africa".
58
In the mid-1970s, when the racist regime introduced the concept of Bantustans in South Africa, many of the FLS refused to lend political legitimacy by recognising the Bantustan administrations. This indeed was another type of political solidarity given to the liberation struggle of South Africans. South Africa hoped that Lesotho, as a full member of the UN, would set the precedent by recognising the Transkei as a Bantustan in October 1976, on account of the fact that Lesotho shared three border posts with this Bantustan. Lesotho refused and South Africa sought to push the tiny state into compliance by closing the entire eastern border between Lesotho and the Transkei. The economic impact of this tension and pressure upon Lesotho will be examined in the following section.
THE IMPACT AND COSTS OF APARTHEID DESTABILISATION ON THE FLS
Joseph Hanlon argues that, "South African aggression and destabilisation has cost its neighbours in excess of $10 billion US dollars in the five years since the founding of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This is more than: All the foreign aid received by the SADC states during this five year period; One-third of the all SADC exports in the past five years."
59
Needless to say, this figure of $10 billion is simply an illustration of the damage for the years 1980 to 1985, and subsequent years are likely to have more than doubled this figure. The overall cost of destabilisation on the FLS through the racist regime's "constellation of states" and "total war strategy" can be assessed in direct war damage; extra military expenditure incurred; higher transport and energy costs incurred; lost exports and tourism; smuggling; refugees; reduced production; and lost economic growth. 60 Hanlon contends, "Thus the price of destabilisation is not simply seen in the dead and displaced, and in the enlarged military budgets. It is also seen in lost development and reduced living standards."
61 It is this aspect -the invisible, intangible aspects of the contribution the people of the FLS made in assisting the liberation of South Africa -in terms of, "lost development and reduced living standards", as they were destabilised (and invaded, as in the case of Angola) -that the current generation of South Africans need to remember when the derogatory term of Makwerekwere is employed in popular discourses against other African nationalities in South Africa (otherwise called "foreigners").
The impact of Lesotho's refusal to recognise the independence of the Transkei in 1976 was South Africa's closing of the entire eastern border between Lesotho and the Transkei, leaving Lesotho without road access and almost cut off from the populated west. It also adversely affected the economic well-being of some 238 114 Basotho, constituting 19% of the population in a landlocked country.
62 Lesotho then appealed to the UN for financial assistance. Pretoria responded by withdrawing the longstanding subsidy on Lesotho's grain products. As Lesotho held out, South Africa was obliged to back down and restrictions were relaxed. 63 Other ways in which Lesotho was pressured by the racist regime was in the Lesotho Government's refusal to hand over refugees to South Africa, in particular Chris Hani. The apartheid regime then proposed an exchange and offered the detained leader of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), Ntsu Mokhehle. However, the Lesotho Government refused to budge.
64
Zambia too was also severely impacted by South African attempts to squeeze the country. As a small country, Zambia occupied a strategic geopolitical position in respect of the liberation of the southern Africa region. As a landlocked country, this contributed to its preoccupation with the liberation struggle in southern Africa, since all its imports and exports went via the southern routes and it sought to lessen its economic dependence on the regional overlord, South Africa. In the long term it was essential to keep these routes open. Another important point is that the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) recruited thousands of workers from Zambia's western province to work in South Africa's mines, as did many Basotho, Batswana and Mozambicans. This historical fact of the economic contribution of other African nationalities to South Africa's colossal mining industrial complex in the building of the economy of South Africa is another critical involvement of the peoples of the region in the indirect and direct assistance to the liberation of South Africa, despite the fact that both these economic migrants and black South Africans were paid meagre wages. They were equally exploited as black and cheap labour.
At the time of Zambia's independence in October 1964, Zambia's economy was one of the richest and fastest growing in the region, but this soon changed when Rhodesia made a Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. Zambia's relations with the south became even more fraught and Zambia had to find reliable independent routes to secure its economy and lessen dependence on South Africa and Rhodesia. In recognition of its economic dependence on South Africa, the Kaunda Government embarked on the Tanzania-Zambia railway (TAZARA) in 1969, which was completed in 1974, and also the Tanzania-Zambia pipeline (TAZAMA), which was completed in 1968 with financial assistance from the Chinese. 65 This tiny country was to experience bombings, sabotage and destruction to its infrastructure by South Africa implying that it had to look for, what turned out to be, expensive import and export routes. South Africa also carried out numerous violations of Zambia' borders and airspace during the year 1980, as well as in 1986, 1988 and 1989. According to Chirwa, "The cost of Zambia's solidarity with the liberation struggle was incalculable".
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Another country targeted by the white minority regime was Zimbabwe after it had gained its independence in April 1980. It was clearly targeted by the white minority racist regime, not only for harbouring South African liberation movements, but principally because of its role in the international campaign for sanctions against South Africa, using its influential positions in organisations, such as the FLS, the NAM, the Commonwealth and the SADCC.
Other aspects of the impact of apartheid on the FLS were the terrorist activities of the apartheid regime against its neighbours. This was essentially a war waged on these countries and direct assassination attempts and killings.
In short, since 1981 there had been a plan by the South African Defence Force (SADF), code-named "Operation Mixer", to assassinate the top 50 leaders of the ANC in exile. The first victim was the local ANC Chief Representative, Joe Gqabi, who was killed by gunfire in the driveway of the ANC "safehouse" in Harare on 31 July 1981. The South African regime also bombed the ANC office in Harare in 1986. There were also attempts at sabotage and assassinations in Zimbabwe. For example, on 16 August 1981 South Africa exploded bombs at the Inkomo Barracks, an arsenal of arms and ammunition, which could be heard 30 km away in Harare.
Five months later, on 18 December 1981, a bomb exploded at the ZANU Headquarters at 88 Manica Road in downtown Harare, killing seven people and injuring 124. Mugabe and other government ministers could have been present and were clearly the target if the meeting had not been delayed.
Such operation was also felt in Lesotho. The Pretoria Government carried out two bungled coup attempts against the Government of Leabua Jonathan in 1972 and in 1974. In addition, it turned to using a surrogate force, similar to those in Mozambique and Angola, in the form of supporting the LLLA.
It began a campaign of bombing in Lesotho in 1979 that caused extensive damage to the Maseru post office, the electricity headquarters, bridges, electricity pylons and telephone posts. In 1982 South Africa was using both economic pressure and the LLA to try and push Lesotho away from the FLS and from support for the ANC. South African commandos raided houses and flats in the centre of Maseru and killed 42 people on 9 December 1982. Among the fatalities were 30 South Africans and 12 Basotho. There was also pressure on Lesotho to sign a non-aggression pact, similar to the one the government of President Samora Machel signed with South Africa on 16 March 1984 in Nkomati.
The complex context of motives as to why Machel's Government signed this pact with "the devil" needs to be understood. It amounts to the fact that Mozambique had been brought down to her knees. It's natural seaport for much of the hinterland and the country was central to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) -a body formed in April 1980 to lessen the economic development of the FLS and, thus, was perceived as a direct economic threat to South Africa.
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According to Hanlon, "By 1983 Frelimo was being pummelled from all sides".
68 It was facing the worst drought in memory that was moving into its third year, while South African attacks and support for the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) was increasing. Despite Machel's overtures to the West for direct foreign investment, the MNR continued to burn grain stores and blow up infrastructure and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the West failed to materialise. The Nkomati Accord -otherwise ironically referred to as, "the policy of Good Neighbourliness" -entailed the Frelimo Government expel nearly all ANC freedom fighters and to deny them access to Mozambique as an important access route. 69 South Africa was supposed to cease its support for the MNR. It shut down the MNR radio station, but did little else.
Mozambique's colleagues in the FLS were in general displeased with Nkomati. It is interesting that Julius Nyerere later said of the Nkomati Accord that it was a "humiliation".
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There was the killing of Ruth First on 17 August 1982 when she opened a parcel bomb that had been sent to the University of Maputo. It was evidently the work of the South African Police. Several years later, in 1988 in Maputo, Albie Sachs lost an arm and sight in one eye when a bomb was placed in his car. 
CUBA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
CONCLUSION
It is also important for us to consider that the dogged destabilisation of the FLS, particularly Zambia and Zimbabwe -as they also had significant white settler communities -was also on account of the fact that they offered alternative visions of a society based on racial equality and respect that were intolerable to apartheid proponents. 79 Apartheid advocates were committed to justifying and hegemonising apartheid ideology, and this required the denial, sabotage and assassination of opponents and alternative visions of existence. That the governments of Cuba, the MPLA of Angola and FRELIMO of Mozambique were ideologically aligned to the Soviet Union also threatened the ethos of free market capitalism that the Pretoria regime adhered to. The threat of communism, as an alternative way of organising society, motivated the regime to destabilise, kill and terrorise the people of the FLS to submit to its hegemony.
Another factor that needs to be considered that contributed to the liberation of South Africa, is that of charismatic personalities. African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, loom large as leaders who played an important role in promoting the cause of freedom for South Africans. They had a personal commitment to the principle of racial equality, national self-determination for oppressed people and the objectives of Pan-Africanism.
History is an important tool for equipping us to deal with the problems of today and tomorrow. It is vital that the South African Government, the church, the mosque, trade unions, the media, students, women's groups, NGOs and other societal institutions are in the forefront of understanding, remembering and disseminating the role other African countries played in the liberation of South Africa. By what method should the dissemination of the history of how African countries assisted the South African liberation struggle be approached, in order to not only dislodge historical amnesia, but to sensitise new generations, remains the challenge. Yet, in order to do this, political will of those committed to this much-needed endeavour is required. Undoubtedly, the academic discipline of history has in the last 23 years of South Africa's post-apartheid era made significant and commendable efforts to unearth the contributions of the FLS to South Africa's freedom.
80 However, the issue remains how the channelling and framing of information about the past is transmitted to inform and educate the South African public -for the process of forgetting historical deeds is also enacted in Afrophobic/xenophobic outbursts. Whilst there appears to be a dialectical relationship between remembering and forgetting, conscious human effort is necessary in paying tribute to the commendable efforts and contributions of our ancestors. Here the author is referring specifically to the series documenting South Africa's history, The road to democracy in South Africa.
